Humans Reached the Roof of the World 40, Years. Learning to Speak Latino. Science Age of Humans. A New Treatment for Blindness. America's Most Revolutionary Artist. At the Smithsonian Visit. Looking at Artists Looking at Themselves. Photos Submit to Our Contest. Photo of the Day. Many predictions have been derived from this theory and tested in various ways, both in the laboratory and in the field [ 4 ]; [ 21 , ch. For example, psychological research using university sports teams shows that prestige and dominance form two distinct and uncorrelated status hierarchies with different emotional and personality profiles [ 24 ].
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Paralleling Radcliffe-Brown's observations, prestigious individuals—in contrast to dominant individuals—tended to be kind, free from bad temper and sought out for advice on many topics. Finally, anthropological research among the Tsimane' in the Bolivian Amazon reveals that both prestige and dominance are associated with higher fitness, though this is achieved via somewhat different routes [ 3 , 41 ]. Much evidence suggests that the answers to all three questions are yes.
To the first question, several lines of empirical work confirm that individuals do use cues of success, competence, skill, knowledge and prestige in figuring out who to learn from. In the laboratory, this is well established in infants [ 42 , 43 ], children see reviews in [ 44 , 45 ] and adults [ 4 , 46 ] across a range of domains.
In the field, the construction of cultural transmission networks on Yasawa Island, Fiji [ 47 ] shows that individuals aggregate a wide range of cues to better target their cultural learning, including cues related to success, knowledge and age. On the second question, evidence also indicates that individuals use cues of success and skill across many domains e. In the laboratory, young children reveal cross-domain effects when they use a model's accuracy in the domain of object labelling as a cue in copying what the model does with novel artefacts [ 48 ]. Such work also reveals that children watch their models for cues of confidence, and deploy these in multiple domains [ 49 , 50 ].
Among adults, a long history of experimental work shows how information about a model's expertise in one domain influences their persuasiveness in other unrelated domains see reviews in [ 4 , 46 ] , and recent work indicates that adults, like children, also use cues of confidence or pride displays [ 51 ] to target their cultural learning. In the fieldwork just discussed, cultural transmission networks reveal that Yasawans' perceptions of a model's success in one domain influences their willingness to learn from that model in other domains [ 47 ].
For example, perceiving someone as the best yam grower increases people's willingness to learn from them about yams by seven times, but similarly increases people's willingness to learn from these individuals about fishing and medicinal plants by between two and three times, even after controlling for learners' perceptions of their success or knowledge of fishing and medicinal plants as well as many other factors like age. In the modern world, the power of celebrity endorsements e. In one recent well-studied case, the celebrity actor—director Angelina Jolie—who is neither a physician nor a medical researcher—wrote a New York Times OP-ED about her decision to get a double mastectomy after finding out that she had a genetic variant associated with an increased risk for breast cancer.
This flood continued for over six months. Finally, much evidence indicates that humans use cultural learning to acquire costly social behaviours. In the laboratory, opportunities to observe prosocial models increase i n -person cooperation [ 54 — 57 ], ii altruistic giving the extensive literature reviewed in [ 58 , ch. In field experiments, cultural learning opportunities increase people's willingness to i help stranded motorists [ 60 ], ii volunteer [ 61 ], iii give blood, iv not jaywalk [ 62 ] and v donate to charity [ 63 ]. In both children and adults, these cultural learning effects are often large, and emerge in both naturalistic anonymous settings and one-shot economic games as well as in repeated economic games.
To explore whether prestige can promote the evolution of cooperation, we constructed a culture—gene coevolutionary model. We assume an infinite population in which a small fraction of the population are high status, and thus capable of pursuing leadership opportunities, such as hunting a turtle, cutting a canoe or leading a raid on another group. The remainder are low status, and thus potential followers. They may step forward and seize the reins of leadership, but if they do, no one follows them, so nothing happens. Individuals undergo the following life cycle:.
Existing work has revealed that prestige and leadership are complex, multifaceted phenomena. This mathematical model seeks to abstract away all that complexity and gain insight about just one unintuitive but potentially important dynamic: Intuitively, it is not obvious why followers would ever pay personal costs to blindly mimic a leader when they could benefit by defecting. Our model illuminates how, even in the absence of punishment, coordination benefits, efficiency or opportunity differences, or any other individual-level motivations to cooperate, the intragenerational dynamics of cultural learning can still cause societies to become steadily more cooperative once prestigious leaders exist.
Consequently, in our model, groups are randomly composed every generation and interactions are one-shot though leaders go first, and followers can then copy , to intentionally remove all effects of repeated interactions, genetic relatedness by common descent and intergroup competition. Our first step is to develop a baseline model for the cultural evolution of cooperation, which assumes all genetic traits are fixed. For convenience, we define the net cost C to an actor as: The bracketed term in 3.
The large bracketed term R is composed of two parts that represent two different phenotypic relationships weighted by their relative contributions. The first term in R captures the association between leaders and followers created by the tendency of followers to copy their leader's behaviour. The second term, which involves p 2 , is the relationship between followers within a group created by the tendency of each follower to acquire behaviours from their leader.
The term p 2 is the probability that in any randomly selected pair both individuals copied the leader. To see the importance of the prestige-bias and how it creates assortment, consider what happens when p approaches 0. The bigger p is, the wider the range of conditions favouring cooperation. Now, let us consider what happens in 3. With this assumption 3. As the group expands, the leader becomes merely one among many, so her direct contribution to R is negligible compared to the associations she produces among her followers.
Here, R reduces to just p 2 —the relationship between any two followers created by the fact that they both copied the leader. First, note that n matters a lot when the prestige effect is weak i. For example, when p is less than about 0.
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However, at the other end, when prestige has a big effect on followers p is large , the size of the groups makes little difference and cooperation spreads under a wide range of conditions. When p is greater than about 0. Conditions for the spread of a cooperative cultural trait. The figure plots the regions specified by equation 3. Of course, it is plausible that p and n are linked such that p necessarily declines as n increases. Does the size of the global population necessarily diminish Angelina Jolie's prestige effects? This is one reason why we did not make p a function of N.
We return to this issue in the discussion. Or, alternatively, some fraction of the prestige effect p may be merely an act of deference to a high status individual e. That is, the follower copies either cooperation or defection from their leader for their action in the moment, but they later revert back to what they learned growing up, and pass this trait onto the next generation in proportion to their payoffs.
This applies equally to both cooperation and defection. Adding this to the Baseline Model, the condition for the spread of a cooperative trait via cultural evolution becomes. This is similar to 3.
The Big Man Mechanism: how prestige fosters cooperation and creates prosocial leaders
This shows that intergenerational transmission is crucial for the evolution of cooperation, especially for cooperation in groups larger than a few individuals. This also means that deference to high status individuals, whether it is derived from prestige or dominance coercion , is the minor player in these models. Now, letting s increase from zero, we can examine the effect of sticky prestige-biased cultural transmission. But, before turning to the plots, let us examine inequality 3. Together, the plots show that the stickier prestige-biased transmission is the bigger s is the broader the conditions favouring cooperation.
However, in small groups with relatively low p -values, s has little impact on the conditions favourable to cooperation. By contrast, when n or p are large, increasing s substantially expands the range of favourable conditions. The effect of stickiness s on the conditions for the spread of a cooperative trait. As we have shown, cooperation can evolve culturally because of how prestige effects create correlated phenotypes.
This pattern opens the door for natural selection, operating in the wake of cultural evolution, to spread genes that make leaders more likely to adopt or express cooperative traits. Such a genetic variant spreads because by cooperating, prestigious leaders can cause their groups to become more cooperative—and they get an equal share of those induced benefits. Thus, we can now ask: We begin by assuming this variant only expresses itself in leaders.
Under these assumptions, more cooperative genetic variants will spread when. Note that this condition is less strict than those derived above for the cultural evolution of cooperation 3. So, in this situation, if cooperation evolves culturally, then genes favouring more cooperativeness in prestigious leaders will always be favoured. Then, the condition for the spread of a cooperation-inducing mutation is. The area above those curves is the region in which the cooperative mutation will spread.
Each panel depicts a different value of n: The conditions for the spread of genetic variants that promote cooperation among prestigious leaders. That is, cooperation-enhancing genetic variants that facultatively express only in small groups will be favoured. The intuition here is that in large groups many mutant followers suffer the costs of cooperation while only one leader benefits from his or her cooperative action. Meanwhile, in small groups, relatively fewer followers suffer. Finally, we framed this as being about a genetic variant.
However, it could also be thought of as a cultural trait, such as a story script, that is acquired early, and evolves more slowly. In developing these ideas, we assumed that learners were constrained from figuring out whether various elements in their model's behavioural repertoire were causally connected to their success or prestige. That is, to some degree captured by our p parameter , individuals have to copy prestigious individuals across many domains, including in the social dilemma used in our model. If they do not copy broadly, we assume they will miss out on learning some important fitness-enhancing traits.
Thus, we have constrained natural selection from sharpening learners abilities to accurately pick out only the fitness-enhancing traits possessed by their models. While this assumption is plausible [ 21 ], it is nevertheless worth relaxing this constraint to see if selection in our model will favour reducing p , or even drive it to zero.
To study this, we take our Baseline Model and ask whether genetic mutants with smaller p -values can invade the cooperative equilibrium. Note we make the conservative assumption that our mutants can do this without fitness penalties for retasking existing brain tissue or for inefficiencies introduced into their learning in other domains.
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The result is simple. Mutants with lower p values are not favoured by natural selection. Instead, such genetic variants are selectively neutral. To see why, realize that at the culturally evolved cooperative equilibrium, cooperation is favoured and common. Mutants will tend to already have the cooperative cultural trait, having acquired it via payoff-biased cultural learning during childhood. Thus, a rare mutant gets neither an advantage at the cooperative equilibrium from not copying the leader nor a disadvantage. Supporting our initial assumption, this result implies that any exogenous constraint, even a weak one, that imposes a cost on distinguishing our key social dilemma from all the other fitness-relevant domains—in which one would benefit from relying on cultural learning—will prevent the invasion of mutants who refuse to copy the leader the deterioration of p.
Motivated by empirical patterns of leadership observed across diverse societies and by recent work on the evolution of prestige, we have developed a set of culture—gene coevolutionary models that explore the conditions under which the existence of prestige-biased cultural transmission can favour both the cultural evolution of cooperation and the genetic evolution of prosocial proclivities in prestigious leaders.
Rooted in informational asymmetries among individuals, these models allow us to begin to draw novel connections between the evolution of prestige, cooperation, prosocial motivations and leadership, and provide a firmer foundation for making predictions about behaviour and psychology. In this final section, we i highlight key insights and empirical predictions derived from our models, ii discuss recent empirical work that provides preliminary evidence for our predictions, and iii outline the weaknesses of our models and highlight key directions for future work.
We derive four key insights and various predictions from our models. In the light of these results, it is worth considering how cultural evolution might have amplified, or otherwise harnessed, this cooperation-inducing mechanism. For example, n and p may be linked in some way, such that p tends to decline as n increases. However, institutions, norms and technologies may mitigate this effect, or even reverse it.
In particular, individuals seeing a large crowd attend to and respond to a skilled orator or renowned leader may be powerfully affected—raising their p value for that leader. Though the size of a crowd that one person can speak to is limited, without big screens, well-designed acoustics and powerful sound systems, some groups may have figured out ways around this.
The Plains Indians, for example, engaged in oratory in very large ceremonies using a gestural sign language that involved expansive movements that were visible at a distance [ 21 ]. Similarly, writing, radio and television may permit one leader to sustain or increase his average p value even in a large group, as might the winning of democratic elections. It is also worth considering whether an oral tradition might gradually increase the p value of a prestigious leader, perhaps even after his or her death. In the absence of the leaders themselves, stories of their heroic acts may spread far and wide, and inspire the young to set higher standards for themselves, and to mimic the valour and sacrifice of their heroes.
Ethnographic evidence suggests that particularly prestigious Big Men gradually transformed after their deaths into even more powerful ancestor spirits, as the repeated retelling of their stories magnified their talents, successes and even their physical size [ 74 ]. Thus, it is plausible that groups may vary in how effectively their institutions and beliefs harness the Big Man Mechanism. Fuelled by such between-group variation, intergroup competition may drive cultural evolution to favour those groups or institutional forms that most effectively exploit this cooperation-enhancing mechanism.
Overall, our effort has been to focus a narrow theoretical beam on one, heretofore unanalysed, aspect that may be important for understanding the nexus of prestige, leadership and cooperation. Of course, as we have emphasized, many other factors and mechanisms no doubt influence both the cooperation generated by leaders and the tendencies of leaders themselves towards prosociality.
Our approach, however, makes several unique predictions, just outlined, that could be addressed through a combination of experimental and observational approaches see below for laboratory experiments , including natural field experiments.
One implication of our approach is that our prestige-cooperation effects should be limited to social species with sufficiently high levels of cultural transmission. This arguably eliminates most animals, and all non-human primates [ 73 ], though it may not eliminate elephants or cetaceans [ 21 , ch. Nevertheless, in contrast to our model, other approaches such as those based on reputation, kin-based allies, signalling and competitive altruism should all readily apply to non-human primates, and predict high levels of leader-based cooperation. To our knowledge, no evidence supports these predictions for non-human primates.
Thus, we suspect our mechanism may lay a human unique, or nearly unique, foundation on which these other cooperation-generating mechanisms can further build. In one experiment [ 82 ], players participated in a trivia contest prior to playing a series of sequential Prisoner's Dilemmas. The trivia contest provided an opportunity to endow some individuals with gold stars, congratulatory ribbons and applause a minor prestige boost while leaving others unadorned. Though players assumed that the gold stars, etc.
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After the trivia contest, pairs of players then repeatedly engaged in a series of one-shot, anonymous, sequential Prisoner's Dilemmas. Half of the time the gold-starred individuals went first, and could either cooperate or defect first, and half of the time they went second. All pairing involved one high prestige gold-starred player and one low prestige non-starred player. Getting the gold star also made individuals more likely to cooperate, but only when they went first. These behavioural differences cashed out into big payoff differences in the aggregate: Such effects seem well known to charitable organizations and universities who begin their fund-raising campaigns by allowing particularly prestigious individuals to take the lead, and make large contributions.
In it's literal usage big man can refer to a tall, stout or muscular man: ODO It can be used as to compliment or encourage maturity in a boy: ODO It can be used as to compliment a man or a boy: Just a few examples of being a Big Man include: Driving much faster than the person in the lane next to you Eating more than anyone else at a party Having a vanity license plate with a "cool" word Beating someone by a lot in a game Wearing sunglasses all the time Drinking more alcohol than someone else Having a "cool" nickname Cracking your knuckles for emphasis by Rufus Rosenstein August 17, 3 Big Man A hard gangster.
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