Carl Schmitt und die Politische Romantik (German Edition)
The University of Strasbourg is dissolved, and Schmitt loses his position November The first parliamentary elections in Weimar Germany are held. The Weimar parliament convenes as a constituent assembly and unicameral parliament February 6. Schmitt begins a professional relationship with the macroeconomist Moritz Julius Bonn, the director of the Handelshochschule , who becomes a strong supporter. Schmitt is appointed lecturer of law at the Handelshochschule , Munich September 1.
Schmitt loses his position at the Handelshochschule , Munich October 1. Schmitt begins a professional friendship with Rudolf Smend, the constitutional lawyer, who becomes a mentor. Schmitt is appointed professor of law at the University of Greifswald fall. Schmitt publishes Die Diktatur: Schmitt publishes Politische Theologie: Walter Rathenau is assassinated by right-wing forces, which preoccupies Schmitt June Schmitt begins a brief friendship which will end in with the writer and poet Hugo Ball, cofounder of the Dada movement in European art.
Schmitt befriends Erik Peterson, Karl Eschweiler, and other theologians; Blei serves as his most important interlocutor about Catholicism. In the third parliamentary elections, the left-wing and right-wing political parties gain significant support, and a center-right minority government Zentrum , DVP, DDP is formed under Reich chancellor Wilhelm Marx Zentrum May 4. Schmitt begins a close professional friendship with the economist Johannes Popitz, a fellow academic-turned-practitioner who initially served and subsequently resisted the Nazi regime. Schmitt receives, and declines, an offer to succeed Hans Kelsen who took up a chair at the University of Cologne as professor of law at the University of Vienna.
Schmitt publishes Der Begriff des Politischen: In the seventh parliamentary elections, the democratic political parties incur further losses, the NSDAP emerges as the strongest political party July 31 , and the presidential government continues under von Papen. Schmitt is appointed professor of law at the University of Cologne September In the eighth parliamentary elections, the democratic political parties incur further losses, the NSDAP remains the strongest political party November 6 , and a presidential government is formed under Reich chancellor Kurt von Schleicher unaffiliated December 3.
Reich president von Hindenburg dissolves parliament February 1. An arson attack on parliament results in the Reichstagsbrand Reichstag fire February In the first parliamentary elections in Nazi Germany, the NSDAP secures a substantial but not absolute majority, and a presidential dictatorship March 5 is formed.
Hitler government abolishes state governments and installs Reich commissars in their stead March 5— The SS establishes Dachau concentration camp March Prompted by Popitz, Schmitt begins to contribute to the drafting of the Reichsstatthaltergesetz and to the law of criminal procedure March The Nazi parliament adopts Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service , excluding most Jews and political opponents from the civil service April 7.
German student associations organize burnings of books by Jews and other presumed enemies of the state May Schmitt receives, and declines, an offer to become professor of law at the University of Munich August. Schmitt is appointed professor of law at the University of Berlin October. Nazi Germany leaves the League of Nations October Zur Reichstagsrede Adolf Hitlers vom Himmler is appointed head of Gestapo and of all police forces outside of Prussia April Von Hindenburg dies, and Hitler becomes Reich president August 2.
Himmler establishes the Inspektion der Konzentrationslager Inspectorate of Concentration Camps , the central SS administrative and managerial authority for all Nazi concentration camps December The Nazi government reintroduces military service, thereby violating the Treaty of Versailles March Nazi Germany occupies the demilitarized Rhineland, thereby violating the Treaty of Versailles March 7. View all subjects More like this Similar Items.
Find a copy online Links to this item Inhaltsverzeichnis. Allow this favorite library to be seen by others Keep this favorite library private. Find a copy in the library Finding libraries that hold this item History Additional Physical Format: Internet resource Document Type: Carl Schmitt Find more information about: Reviews User-contributed reviews Add a review and share your thoughts with other readers.
A more serious challenge to this position, but now linked to the s and the arrival of Pope John XXIII, is Barion's insistence that the new teaching of the church developed in the wake of Vatican II does not have a foundation in the dogma. In order to reject the progressive theological stance of Pope John, Barion, like Peterson before him, denies the legitimacy of a specific political doctrine as derived from the dogma.
Again, the writings of Augustine become crucial testimony to support Barion's intervention. As we have seen, Schmitt's return to the question of political theology occurred at a specific time, one critical for the fate of the Roman Catholic Church. Vatican II raised the question of a necessary political involvement of the Church on the progressive side.
Those who disagreed with this development, like the conservative political scientist Hans Maier, referred back to Peterson in order to reject the political theology of Vatican II. In the discussion of the late s, in which Schmitt finds himself involved as a defender of political theology, he does not really question the theoretical possibility of a political use of the Christian faith or, to put it more cautiously, the political implications of theological positions. At the center of the debate as Schmitt certainly realizes in his polemic against Ernst Feil we find the disagreement over the political goals—a progressive or conservative commitment, democracy or authority.
Schmitt's own defense of political theology would clearly not include a theology of revolution proposed by the radical left wing of the Church. It is difficult, if not impossible, for Schmitt to relate to a descriptive concept of political theology, as can be gleaned from his critique of Ernst Topitsch, who proposed a sociological approach to the problem.
For Schmitt Topitsch's method amounts to neutralization and positivism, since it excludes the moments of commitment and action. At the same time, he discusses its function in as a possible analogy between Constantine and Hitler or Stalin, suggesting that the historical material does not sufficiently support this analogy. But Schmitt's real aim transcends this skeptical argument; he means to demonstrate not only the feasibility of political theology but its inevitability given the public role of the Church in the world Sichtbarkeit der Kirche.
Basically, he does this by reorganizing and reinterpreting the historical material that Peterson had used to demonstrate the incompatibility of political theology and Christianity. Here it is important to remember that Peterson's early work, especially his monograph Heis Theos , was an important text for Schmitt, since it seemed to confirm Max Weber's concept of the charismatic leader PT II, On the whole, Schmitt's strategy is to broaden the discussion by including non-Christian forms of political theology and stressing sovereignty rather than monarchy.
The aim is to deflect the interest of the reader from the theological point that Peterson wants to make, i.
If Peterson cannot, as Schmitt suggests, distinguish between a legitimate king and a charismatic leader, his entire argument is too simplistic to be of any use. Obviously, however, this strategy does not get to the core of Peterson's argument, as Schmitt realizes when he finally squarely focuses on Peterson's theological reservations. He rightly emphasizes that Peterson's negative verdict is exclusively directed against a Christian form of political theology and he also correctly notes that the historical evidence that Peterson presents is more ambiguous than the conclusion the latter finally draws.
The most apparent case would be that of Eusebius, the friend and counselor of Emperor Constantine, whom Peterson, following Jacob Burckhardt, describes as a dubious politician. The crucial issue here is, as Schmitt knows, not the good or bad reputation of the bishop of Caesaria but his theological position. In other words, the question is: Can one derive a valid form of political theology from his theological statements on the trinity? Or was he a secret supporter of Arius, who had denied the similarity of God the father and Christ?
Schmitt's defense of Eusebius uses both historical political and theological arguments. By placing the bishop in the context of the Concilium of Nicea he stresses the inseparable unity of the political and the theological aspect. It is interesting and important to observe how Schmitt changes the character of the problem when he suggests that there is ultimately no position, outside of the political that even a completely orthodox theologian would turn into a political theologian as soon as he participates in the public debate.
We have to remind ourselves that this is not Peterson's problem. Peterson wants to demonstrate that a legitimate form of political theology cannot be derived from Christian dogma because of the essential category of the trinity. Schmitt does not respond to this challenge by giving evidence for Eusebius's correct interpretation of the trinity and a correct deduction of the political monarchy from this dogma. Instead, he shifts the argument to an assessment of the Roman Empire in the light of the eschatological expectations heilsgeschichtliche Endzeiterwartung of the Church.
Obviously this statement is not normative but descriptive and historical. And this is, it seems, the level where Schmitt wants to situate the question of political theology. The assumed ubiquity of the political extends into the theological realm and becomes the public space of the Church. It is the political mission of the Church that he wants to defend, while Peterson wants to restrict this mission. Therefore the question of whether one can devise a valid form of political theology from a specific theological dogma is not the crucial issue for Schmitt.
For him, the mere fact that a theological argument extends into the realm of praxis makes it political. Rethinking the question of political theology after the war and in particular his disagreement with his former friend Peterson, Schmitt realized that Peterson meant to send him a message about the consequences of the recent alliance between state and church in Germany and the role of those who favored this alliance, for example Schmitt himself.
The defense of Eusebius uses the familiar argument of the ubiquity of the political. Peterson's retreat from the political to the theological sphere cannot solve the problem because this move is as much a political decision as the support of the alliance. This argument undermines the very distinction that Peterson made to save the church. With some justification Schmitt points out that Peterson's essay is itself a political intervention in the name of pure theology against political corruption, here personified by Eusebius's support for Constantine. The ground for this defense is explicated in the following paragraph when Schmitt shifts the argument from the theological to the political sphere and suggests going back to his concept of the political that in a period of crisis clear distinctions between state and church are no longer effective.
The point Schmitt wants to make is that in a period of crisis like the pretension of absolute purity cannot be upheld. The politicization of religion and its institutions becomes as inevitable as the transfer of religious concepts into the political realm. The example for this kind of corruption is Heidegger, who, according to Peterson, transferred the commitment to God and Christ into a commitment to the charismatic leader Hitler, PT II, Ultimately, Schmitt's refutation of Peterson never quite focuses on the most basic disagreement, which involves the theological interpretation of history.
What is the meaning of history? This aspect becomes much clearer in Schmitt's response to Hans Blumenberg, which is added to the essay as a postscript.
His attempt to create a legitimate space for himself as a non-theologian who moves into the field of theology by demarcating his own position as strictly defined in legal terms juristisch has to cover the fact that Schmitt makes theological claims, claims that transcend the safe method of stating analogies and pointing to the fate of theological concepts and ideas in a process of secularization. For Schmitt secularization is not, as we will see, a neutral term. In a letter to Helmut Rumpf May It does not suffice therefore to emphasize Schmitt's definition of political categories as secularized theological concepts; one has to see the concept of secularization in Schmitt's late work as a theological notion.
At the same time the Catholic commitment and consequently the belief in the coexistence of a spiritual and a worldly realm has not prevented Schmitt from favoring a political solution of the conception of the Catholic Church, i. Given the basic pattern, it did not matter whether one supported or rejected the National Socialists.
In either case the priority of the Church would be preserved, which means that the support of National Socialism is seen as a secondary commitment only. In Politische Theologie II Schmitt, now removed from his involvement in , reiterated the need for a political theology based on the Roman-Catholic Church. The much-quoted testimony for this self-understanding is the statement in Glossarium: Already in Politische Theologie I this question was foregrounded in Schmitt's attempt to define the relationship between theological and legal concepts.
For Schmitt legal concepts were secularized theological concepts. However, in Schmitt did not fill out the theological frame by referring to the end of history. In Politische Theologie II , through the discussion of the function of the Roman Empire for the Church, this topic came into the foreground. While Peterson's theology denied validity to the realm of secular history, Blumenberg's aim was primarily to rescue the secular human sphere from the obsolete demands of theology.
In this respect, while disagreeing with Schmitt, Blumenberg raised the very questions that challenge the legitimacy of absolute theological claims. For this reason, Schmitt was justified in his assessment that Blumenberg's critique of his work, in particular his understanding of the process of secularization, appears as an appropriate continuation of the debate.
These remarks, while they seemingly only summarize the book, already anticipate the strategy of Schmitt's response. By emphasizing the scientific nature of Blumenberg's approach, he suggests that Blumenberg ultimately cannot do justice to the metaphysical aspects of the problem. It is interesting to note that he takes over Blumenberg's key concept to describe historical changes in the field of theology and philosophy, but seems to be uncertain how to use it. But what precisely is the nature of the disagreement? Schmitt presents his own position as that of a legal scholar who accepts and supports Western rationalism as it was developed against religious and theological claims in the field of law and politics.
The state, he reminds us, is a specifically modern institution. Blumenberg's central theme is the problematization of the category of secularization as a method to explain the modern age Neuzeit as a qualitatively distinct period of history, a period that has left behind a theological Christian interpretation of the world. Secularization, Blumenberg argues, is used in different areas and ways to demonstrate the dependence of the modern age on previous historical formations.
The concept of secularization thereby undermines the legitimacy of modernity and the Enlightenment. The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History , which offers a rereading of German Idealism, especially of Hegel, that stresses the moment of transformation from theological to modern philosophical thought. In this context Christian Heilsgeschichte became philosophical progress.
The shift from a transcendent to an immanent interpretation of the world cannot be explained by the concept of secularization. Blumenberg suggests that the persuasive force of the secularization thesis is largely a linguistic phenomenon—the similarity of linguistic formulations where the actual historical processes and actions are quite dissimilar.
Schmitt's political theology would be a case in point: The criticism comes from an unexpected angle, since Blumenberg emphasizes the slowness and inadequacy of the process of modernization in Europe. What Schmitt reads as a specifically modern secularization of theological concepts may well be the belated status of basic legal and political concepts.
It is, in other words, the incompleteness of the process of the Enlightenment that Blumenberg holds against Schmitt's thesis. The specific angle of Blumenberg's critique offers Schmitt the opportunity to answer the criticism by focusing on the legal aspect while downplaying the theological and by foregrounding the problem of modernity that Blumenberg himself had stressed.
The postscript of Politische Theologie II proves beyond any doubt that Schmitt fully understood the challenge of Blumenberg's thesis, far beyond the specific criticism of his early work.
Therefore his response aims to radicalize this thesis to the point where its problematic nature will be apparent. The choice of words makes clear that Schmitt is, to say the least, uncomfortable with Blumenberg's claim.
But he does not close the door by simply restating the need for transcendence and the limitation of human knowledge and planning. Instead, he opens a dialogue by suggesting to Blumenberg that the theological debate between him and Peterson, including a serious reassessment of Gnosis, might be the way to understand his concept of the political.
As it turns out, the assessment and evolution of Gnostic thought patterns becomes central in the dialogue with Blumenberg. We have to remember that for Blumenberg Gnostic dualism and the need for redemption of the world because of its basic imperfection is the unresolved problem of medieval theology, a problem that only the modern age would overcome. In his dialog with Blumenberg, Schmitt acknowledges this position without accepting it.
In fact, he reintroduces the Gnostic dualism between a bad creator God and the God of redemption to ground his own political theology. By claiming to uncover a universal pattern, Schmitt also includes the Christian faith. He does this by underlining the proximity of Augustine and Gnosis with the distinction, of course, that for Augustine the human beings are to blame for the evil in the world.
Whether one follows the Gnostic or the Augustinian argument makes no fundamental difference: As a result, there can be no basic change or improvement of the human condition. Neither reforms nor revolutions can accomplish this. In other words, Blumenberg's thesis is forcefully rejected. It is the function of the state to limit the political implication of stasis civil war. Not surprisingly therefore, Schmitt defends the need for a political theology in a strict sense of the term, since in secularized modern versions of the political the older patterns remain intact.
Without mentioning Blumenberg, at the end Schmitt restates his position in strong terms. It is no less than a complete rejection of modernity, i. The final statement also illuminates the importance and range of Blumenberg's provocation, which is much more fundamental than the intervention of Peterson. The disagreement concerns the historical function of Christianity, especially in the transition from the Middle Ages to modernity; a form of questioning that was equally alien to the theologian and the legal theorist. Blumenberg forced Schmitt to rethink the theological foundations of his position and, at the same time, enabled him to sharpen the theological argument.
Duncker & Humblot - Berlin: Politische Theologie
Now he can do what Peterson denied: We have to realize that Schmitt is developing his private theology that would not be acceptable to the Catholic Church. If one separates the two persons of God in such a way that Christ the redeemer must turn against his father, then he takes on the character of a rebel who endangers the work of God. It is the human, the promethean side that has to be checked. Christ the rebel is responsible for the division within God, which in turn is responsible for the origin of the political in Schmitt's sense.
The reality of the enemy as the organizing principle of the world can therefore always be retraced to its theological origins. Despite the conciliatory rhetoric of the postscript, Blumenberg could not overlook the severity of Schmitt's rebuttal with the implied claim that a solution could be found only within the theological framework offered by Schmitt. Still, Blumenberg decided to approach Schmitt and enter a dialogue. Instead, it is the difference of their positions theologically, philosophically, and anthropologically that defines the nature and direction of their dialogue.
In the context of this essay a detailed analysis of this dialogue cannot be offered. It must suffice to follow the process of the mutual clarification of their respective positions, a process in which the younger partner was more interested than the older one. Blumenberg takes up the challenge by explicitly questioning his solution to the problem of secularization. In this question he maintains his goal, i.
Oh no, there's been an error
At the same time, he tries to define the methodological difference between Schmitt's assessment and his own. But the explication does not go beyond this brief statement. Instead, he suggests that Blumenberg's approach is indebted to Troeltsch and Max Weber, i.
Of course, this seemingly neutral assessment of the difference is anything but neutral, since it places Blumenberg within a scientific tradition that tries to neutralize theological concepts. Furthermore, Schmitt refers to his study Der Nomos der Erde to demonstrate his own understanding of the difference between a theological and a secular, juridical approach to the question of war.